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Abstract
In this paper I argue that no state should legalise euthanasia, either voluntary or non-voluntary. I begin by
outlining three political arguments against such legalisation, by Russell Hittinger, Elizabeth Anscombe and
David Novak. Each concludes, on different grounds, that legalised euthanasia fatally erodes the role and
authority of the state. Although correct in their conclusion, the arguments they provide are deficient. To fill
this gap, I elaborate what I call a ‘fourfold dialectic’ between autonomy and compassion, the two central
motivations for legalising euthanasia. I show that these motivations systematically and progressively
undermine each other, yielding a situation where individual autonomy and doctors’ duty of care are effectively
eviscerated. It follows that state authority, which depends on upholding both of these, is itself eviscerated. In
this way, the conclusion of the political arguments above finally finds demonstrative support.
This article is available in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/
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 The Future in Our Hands? 
A Dialectical Argument against Legalising Euthanasia 
 
Tom P. S. Angier 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 At the heart of the debate on the legalisation of assisted suicide and euthanasia there lies 
a deep disagreement about the significance of a moral philosophical principle: namely, the 
principle of double effect.1 The latter holds, in brief, that for any action, certain of its effects 
will be intended, and certain of them merely foreseen. An action is permissible, at least pro 
tanto, when none of its bad or evil effects is intended, either as ends or means, i.e. each is 
merely foreseen. In addition, there must be proportionately grave reason for permitting such 
bad or evil effects.2 Traditionally, this principle has been taken to permit the withdrawal of 
futile, unduly burdensome or disproportionate medical treatment – as well as the giving of 
painkillers – even where a foreseen (yet non-intended) side-effect of these actions is the 
patient’s likely death. Equally traditionally, the principle of double effect has been taken to 
prohibit assisted suicide and euthanasia, since both involve the intention to kill (with the 
doctor either assisting the patient to realise this intention, or directly achieving it him- or 
herself). Granted, such intentional killing may be done for a good end, e.g. to relieve what is 
judged unbearable and irremediable suffering – but that does not detract from the inherent, or 
all-things-considered badness of the killing itself. On the traditional view, to afford medical 
professionals even the limited power to kill is replete with dangers, and must be absolutely 
prohibited; only the non-intentional bringing about of death is permissible, and must, 
moreover, be strictly regulated. 
 
 The traditional view, which takes the distinction between intention and foresight with 
the utmost seriousness, inscribing it in legislation, is clearly at work in two judgements from 
Britain’s House of Lords. As the Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical 
Ethics puts matters, ‘society’s prohibition of intentional killing … is the cornerstone of law 
and social relationships. It protects each one of us impartially, embodying the belief that all 
are equal’.3 And as Lord Goff of Chieveley writes, there is a ‘Rubicon which runs between on 
the one hand the care of the living patient and on the other hand euthanasia – actively causing 
his death to avoid or end his suffering’.4 That there exists such a ‘Rubicon’ has, however, 
increasingly been questioned, especially by consequentialist philosophers and their followers. 
For the consequence of (e.g.) withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, and of deliberately 
administering a lethal dosage, is, as they point out, the same: the patient dies. And if the 
patient’s suffering is truly unbearable and irremediable, why not bring it to an end directly 
                                                 
1 The principle is named after Thomas Aquinas’ formulation of it, which involves the term ‘duplex effectus’. See 
his discussion of killing in self-defence: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), IIa IIae Q. 64 art. 7. 
2 For an excellent summary of the principle, see David Oderberg, Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist 
Approach (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 76-7. For more detail, see David Oderberg, Moral Theory: A 
Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), ch. 3. 
3 Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics (Chairman: Lord Walton), 31st January 1994, 
para. 237. Quoted in John Finnis, ‘Discourse, Truth, and Friendship’, in Reason in Action – Collected Essays: 
Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 2, 57.  
4 Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, 4th February 1993, AC 789. Quoted in John Finnis, ‘Intentionally Killing the 
“Permanently Unconscious”’, in Intention and Identity – Collected Essays: Volume II (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), ch. 19, 313. 
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 and assuredly? Is this not more compassionate than the alternatives? Besides, there are 
grounds, it is argued, for questioning the very distinction between intention and foresight. 
How are we to verify whether a death was intended or merely foreseen? As sponsors of the 
distinction acknowledge, even withdrawal of treatment can, in certain circumstances, amount 
to intentional killing.5 And in terms of philosophical psychology, is there any robust line to be 
drawn between intending and foreseeing? Surely, the sceptics maintain, intention reduces to 
how one directs one’s mental attention; and if so, it is relatively easy to avoid the charge of 
intending to kill.    
     
 These and other criticisms have been levelled, relentlessly, at the principle of double 
effect.6 Philosophers such as David Oderberg have, arguably, provided it with equally robust 
defences (see note 2), but it remains the case that legally, at least, the principle has been put 
on the back foot. To take an example from American jurisprudence, Judge Reinhardt, in 
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, has emphasised ‘the similarity between what doctors are 
now permitted to do’ – viz. give painkillers with the intent to suppress pain – ‘and what the 
plaintiffs assert they should be permitted to do’ – viz. give painkillers with the intent to kill.7 
In the Netherlands, Harry Kuitert did much to erase the distinction between ‘active 
euthanasia’ and (so-called) ‘passive euthanasia’, thereby paving the way for the legalisation of 
voluntary, active euthanasia in 2002.8 Indeed, many scholars of jurisprudence are now loath to 
place any weight on the distinction between intended and merely foreseen death. According to 
Nicholas Bamforth and David Richards, for example, to do so is to affirm a form of legal 
‘fundamentalism’.9 Judge Reinhardt, for his part, declares that laws prohibiting assisted 
suicide do ‘injury’ to some citizens solely ‘to satisfy the moral or religious precepts of a 
portion of the population’.10 And the Royal Dutch Medical Association, or KNMG, is of the 
view that an outright ban on intentional killing is ‘an extreme and rigid position’11 – a view 
that directly influenced the Dutch Supreme Court. 
 
 Notwithstanding this shift in legal opinion, I shall argue that the traditional view is the 
right one. Not only is there clear evidence that jurisdictions which have crossed the moral 
Rubicon, and made intentional killing part of medicine, now face manifold and increasing 
evils. It was also inevitable that those evils awaited them in the first place. For despite 
ubiquitous appeals to autonomy and compassion – appeals which have some prima facie 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Oderberg, Applied Ethics, 74; John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An 
Argument against Legalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 42; John Keown, ‘A New 
Father for the Law and Ethics of Medicine’, in Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis, ed. 
John Keown and Robert P. George (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), ch. 18, 296-9. 
6 See, for example, James Rachels, The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 92-6; Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (3rd edition) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 7. 
Finnis diagnoses these criticisms as a hallmark of secular liberalism. See his ‘Secularism and “The Culture of 
Death”’, in Religion and Public Reasons – Collected Essays: Volume V (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), ch. 22, esp. 340-41. 
7 Quoted in Russell Hittinger, ‘Private Uses of Lethal Force: The Case of Assisted Suicide’, in The First Grace: 
Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World (Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books, 2003), ch. 6, 149. 
Cf. Finnis, ‘Euthanasia and the Law’, in Human Rights and Common Good - Collected Essays: Volume III 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 16, 256. 
8 See Harry Kuitert, Een Gewenste Dood: Euthanasie en Zelfbeschikking als Moreel en Godsdienstig Probleem 
(Baarn: Ten Have, 1981), 29. I say ‘so-called’ because ‘passive euthanasia’ suggests that withdrawing treatment 
is necessarily a species of killing, a claim repudiated by those who uphold the traditional view.  
9 See Nicholas C. Bamforth and David A. J. Richards, Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of 
New Natural Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ch. 8. 
10 See Hittinger, The First Grace, 143. 
11 Quoted in Gerbert van Loenen, Do You Call This A Life? Blurred Boundaries in the Netherlands’ Right-to-Die 
Laws (London, Ontario: Ross Lattner, 2015), 115.  
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 plausibility – it is precisely these notions that, when properly understood, generate the deep 
iniquities which assisted suicide- and euthanasia-practising regimes effectively embody. In 
order to show this, I shall begin by exploring three species of what I shall call the ‘political 
argument’ against euthanasia.12 While this argument, as elaborated by Russell Hittinger, 
Elizabeth Anscombe and David Novak, is fundamentally on the right track, I will argue that – 
in its extant forms – it is incomplete, and misleadingly formulated. I will then move on to 
elaborate what I will call the ‘fourfold dialectic’ between individual autonomy and 
compassion for suffering. These two values constitute the central motivations behind the 
legalisation of euthanasia. Once they are unpacked, however, and the dialectical relations 
between them clarified, we will see that they inevitably and repeatedly undermine each other, 
generating a form of delusive practice. With this dialectical framework in place, we will 
finally be in a position to grasp the essential justice of the political argument. It is to the latter, 
then, that I now turn. 
 
I. The Political Argument 
 
 Russell Hittinger develops the political argument against euthanasia in the context of 
American jurisprudence, but this context is inessential and I shall abstract from it in what 
follows. Hittinger begins with the observation that since (what he calls) ‘postmodern states’ 
are ‘[u]nsure of the scope of their own sovereignty, [they] are prepared to relocate sovereignty 
in the individual; in other words, postmodern states are prepared to be the guarantor of the 
rights of individual autonomy’.13 Such rights are relatively benign when they are balanced 
against considerations of the common good. But because such states increasingly absolutise 
individual autonomy – in the American case, invoking a strong right to privacy, or 
(alternatively) a strong ‘liberty interest’ – we see the advent of (purported) rights that threaten 
the common good. The limiting and most dangerous case of this, Hittinger maintains, is the 
right of citizens to request euthanasia, and the right of doctors, after due consideration, to 
facilitate their request. For, as he summarises things, ‘Men and women … cannot exercise a 
private franchise to use lethal force and still enjoy political order’.14 On what grounds does he 
make this claim? According to Hittinger, ‘political order’ depends, inter alia, on the state’s 
‘preserving its monopoly over lethal force’,15 for only the state properly has the authority to 
deploy such force. True, health-care professionals are often ‘impartial’ third parties, but they 
are not ‘official legislators, judges, or executives’, viz. the only personnel who, after due legal 
process, are empowered ‘to take away life, liberty, or property’.16 To delegate to doctors the 
state’s right to use lethal force is hence ‘asserting that the right be exercised without the 
ordinary constraints that the state must observe’17 – and this is destructive of political order. 
 
 Hittinger fills out his argument by citing Locke. In the Second Treatise of Government, 
§87, Locke holds that ‘Those who … have a common established Law and Judicature to 
appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies … are in Civil Society … ; but those who 
have no such common Appeal … are still in the state of Nature, each being … Judge for 
                                                 
12 From now on, I shall use ‘euthanasia’ disjunctively, to cover either (doctor-)assisted suicide or euthanasia 
proper. For although these raise somewhat different moral issues (e.g. of guilt), the legal issues they raise are 
substantially similar, at least when euthanasia is voluntary, i.e. consented to. Of course, euthanasia can also be 
non-voluntary, i.e. performed where consent is impossible. When I discuss euthanasia of this sort, I shall make it 
clear.  
13 Hittinger, The First Grace, 137. 
14 Hittinger, The First Grace, 137. 
15 Hittinger, The First Grace, 154. 
16 Hittinger, The First Grace, 154. 
17 Hittinger, The First Grace, 154. 
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 himself and Executioner’.18 It follows, Hittinger adjures, that if the state transfers the power to 
use lethal force from one or more duly constituted public authorities ‘back to individuals’, this 
is ‘tantamount to dissolving civil society’.19 Hittinger grants that, unlike in Locke’s State of 
Nature, those requesting euthanasia have given their consent to the use of lethal force, and are 
therefore not strictly its victims. But this is not sufficient, he insists, ‘for determining who has 
authority, under the social contract, to use lethal force’.20 For the state’s monopoly on such 
force, together with the legal constraints which govern its use, is a common good. It cannot be 
construed, therefore, ‘on the model of commutative justice at private law where the consent of 
parties to a contract is a principal fact considered by the law’.21 To do so confuses legal with 
commutative justice, and this, Hittinger contends, is both inadmissible and highly injurious.22 
For in effect it erases the distinction between public and private law, with the upshot that ‘no 
one could know with any assurance where crime begins or ends’.23 For this reason, he 
concludes, ‘private franchises to use lethal force are repugnant to government as such’.24 
 
 The overall argument is clear, but not cogent as it stands. For a start, Hittinger’s 
continual reference to ‘lethal force’ is tendentious, since it suggests that doctors are coercing 
their patients, which ex hypothesi they are not. But there are more serious problems with the 
argument. On the one hand, it leaves a wide loophole for euthanasia advocates to exploit, 
since nowhere does Hittinger show it would be impossible to make euthanasia a matter of due 
public process. Perhaps there are significant practical problems to be overcome in this respect, 
and these may be sufficient to stymie a judicially-administered euthanasia regime. But this is 
not yet to show that such a regime is impossible in principle. On the other hand, it is doubtful 
whether Hittinger has secured his basic claim that medical oversight of euthanasia is 
insufficiently public, and thus necessarily beyond the purview of criminal justice. At least in 
some countries, doctors are functionaries of the state, and certainly in the Netherlands and 
Belgium, state bodies claim to monitor the provision of euthanasia in their respective 
jurisdictions. Even in the United States, as Hittinger admits, ‘in the case of physicians, these 
are no ordinary private parties, but rather are private agents whose professional competence is 
licensed by the state’.25 So it is not obvious, as yet, that euthanasia is so far below the radar of 
public scrutiny that its practitioners threaten the very existence of sound and effective 
government.26 The suspicion remains that Hittinger is trading on Locke’s vision of a descent 
into the State of Nature, where each person is ‘Judge for himself and Executioner’ – though in 
the case of euthanasia, no such descent has been established. 
 
 Elizabeth Anscombe agrees with Hittinger, insofar as she, too, takes the legalisation of 
euthanasia to be destructive of state authority.27 But her grounds are significantly different. 
Perhaps because she is writing in 1980s Britain, where health care is provided largely by the 
state, she treats euthanasia ab initio as having to be supervised and implemented by state 
                                                 
18 Quoted in Hittinger, The First Grace, 157. 
19 Hittinger, The First Grace, 157. 
20 Hittinger, The First Grace, 158. 
21 Hittinger, The First Grace, 158. 
22 David Novak also argues that legalising euthanasia confuses issues of the common good with those proper to 
private contract. See David Novak, The Sanctity of Human Life (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 
2007), 145, 147.   
23 Hittinger, The First Grace, 158-9. 
24 Hittinger, The First Grace, 159. 
25 Hittinger, The First Grace, 154. 
26 Indeed, given that direct legal oversight of euthanasia would entail a massively ‘statist’ conception of its 
provision, perhaps it is preferable that the authority to carry it out is delegated to doctors. 
27 See Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Murder and the Morality of Euthanasia’, in Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays 
by G. E. M. Anscombe (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005), ch. 21. 
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 authority. Now for Hittinger, this would open the door to the justification of euthanasia, since 
he believes it is first and foremost lack of state involvement which renders euthanasia 
impermissible. Not so Anscombe. As she argues, ‘Some think it would be within the 
competence of the State to authorise such killing as seems necessary for the common good. 
But’, she continues, ‘the right of the State to use violence has such a foundation as to put that 
idea right out of court’.28 Why so? Because, according to Anscombe, that foundation is ‘the 
human need of protection against unjust attack’.29 But in a euthanasia-practising regime, the 
state not only permits the killing of innocent people, it actually carries it out. It follows that it 
has undermined (a key aspect of) its own foundation, namely to protect citizens against 
injustice; indeed, it has denatured itself further, by becoming the agent of injustice. As 
Anscombe sums up her argument, ‘if the civil authority itself attacks innocent people, it 
nullifies the basis on which its use of violence is different from that of a gangster band. This 
remains true even if it pleads the common good as an excuse … Civil authority cannot make 
it policy to decide on or license the killing of innocent people without losing the character of 
civil authority’.30 
 
 The argument is ambitious, since like Hittinger’s, it claims to show that euthanasia 
eviscerates state authority. And it manages to close Hittinger’s loophole, since it envisions 
euthanasia as a form of state, not private action. But is it persuasive? The weakness of 
Anscombe’s argument lies in her conception of injustice. She holds, plausibly, that ‘someone 
who is murdered suffers a great wrong’,31 but her definition of murder is tendentious – viz. as 
necessarily involving ‘the intentional killing of the innocent’.32 This entails that any state that 
legalises and implements euthanasia is, in effect, a murderous regime, and hence is doing 
those who request and undergo it a ‘great wrong’. But this is too quick. For as Anscombe 
allows, there is at least one class of persons which can rightfully be put to death by the state – 
namely, those judged guilty of heinous crime. And if so, the question arises of why another 
exception to the category of ‘state murder’ could not be made, viz. those requesting and being 
judged fit to receive euthanasia. As David Benatar argues, philosophers like Anscombe 
extend ‘the inviolability principle only to innocent humans, and seem[…] to allow for the 
capital punishment of those convicted of a sufficiently serious crime … [but if so,] why may 
we not make a similar exception for those who are suffering unbearably? While the latter, 
unlike the former, may be ‘innocent’, the relevance of this is merely stipulated by opponents 
of euthanasia’.33 
 
 At this juncture, Anscombe appears to shift her ground, emphasising not so much the 
attack on human innocence as a condition of injustice, as the attack on human innocence. 
Being a human person imports ‘a tremendous dignity’, she declares, and in virtue of this, we 
cannot treat humans as we treat other animals. True, we can euthanise a dog, say, thereby 
‘putting it out of its misery’: ‘sympathy makes it feel indecent to put up with its gross 
suffering, and may even incline one to terminate a reduced and pathetic existence’.34 But 
human animals are different: we are ‘spirit as well as flesh’,35 rational as well as instinctual, 
                                                 
28 Anscombe, ‘Murder …’, 265. 
29 Anscombe, ‘Murder …’, 265. 
30 Anscombe, ‘Murder …’, 265-6. 
31 Anscombe, ‘Murder …’, 266. 
32 Anscombe, ‘Murder …’, 262. 
33 David Benatar, ‘Assisted Suicide, Voluntary Euthanasia, and the Right to Life’, in The Right to Life and the 
Value of Life, ed. J. Yorke (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 297. Another ‘opponent of euthanasia’ who 
makes this stipulation is John Keown. See, e.g., Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy, 41 n. 3. 
34 Anscombe, ‘Murder …’, 269. 
35 Anscombe, ‘Murder …’, 269. 
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 and this should elicit a reverence and respect which is different in kind from that elicited by 
the life of a dog. To think otherwise, Anscombe asserts, is to treat human life as a mere 
‘amenity’,36 i.e. something to be discarded when it has become incommodious. Much could 
be said here, but I think two points are worth bringing out. First, more needs to be said to 
show that humans’ possession of a rational ‘spirit’ provides strong grounds, in and of itself, to 
outlaw euthanasia. It could be objected that it is precisely such rationality that warrants the 
state’s serious consideration of requests for euthanasia in the first place. Secondly, and 
crucially, in shifting her ground Anscombe has effectively embarked upon a foundational 
moral argument, thereby abandoning her attempt to provide a purely political argument 
against legalising euthanasia. While that moral project is valuable per se, and one richly 
reflected elsewhere,37 it is far too complex to be unpacked and assessed here. 
 
David Novak’s political argument against legalising euthanasia is, in a sense, the least 
ambitious of the three surveyed here. This is because he neither claims that legalisation 
destroys state authority, nor embarks on a foundational moral argument. Rather, he focuses on 
how euthanasia purportedly undermines ‘the prime raison d’être of a society’,38 a raison 
d’être the state should reflect and support. Novak prepares the ground by arguing that 
modern, liberal conceptions of autonomy have become ‘radically individualistic’, rendering 
individuals’ involvement with the state highly instrumental, and little more than a ‘necessary 
evil’.39 The limiting case of this is state-provided euthanasia, since here individual citizens 
expect the state to provide a personal death-service – despite its severely detrimental effects 
on the common good. Novak argues for the latter on the grounds that euthanasia-provision 
directly contradicts ‘the prime raison d’être of a society’, which is ‘to care for all of its 
members in ways they are not able to care for themselves by themselves…’40 Part of this care, 
he maintains, ‘should be the concern for self-destructive, suicidal persons … even if that harm 
[viz. suicide] is self-chosen behaviour’.41 Such care reflects what Novak calls ‘primary human 
sociality, [the] primary need for others to need me and want me to abide in the world with 
them’.42 Without such care – from the family, first, but also from the state – society sends a 
message to those tempted by euthanasia of ‘ultimate abandonment’.43 
 
 This argument has emotive appeal, but also papers over key difficulties. We can agree 
that ‘the prime raison d’être of a society is to care for all of its members in ways they are not 
able to care for themselves by themselves…’44 But it does not follow from this that euthanasia 
should be outlawed. For despite Novak’s tendentious reference to lethal ‘violence’45 – 
echoing here both Hittinger and Anscombe – he has not yet shown that killing cannot be a 
form of care. Granted, and as Anscombe points out, ‘you cannot take care of something by 
                                                 
36 Anscombe, ‘Murder …’, 270. 
37 See, e.g., Robert Spaemann’s reflections on the incomparable value of human beings, and the ‘ontological 
dimension’ of their dignity: Robert Spaemann, Essays in Anthropology: Variations on a Theme, trans. Guido de 
Graaff & James Mumford (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2010), ch. 3; Robert Spaemann, ‘Human Dignity 
and Human Nature’, in Love and the Dignity of Human Life: On Nature and Natural Law, trans. David L. 
Schindler (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2012). See also Oderberg, Applied 
Ethics, 59, 67, on the intrinsic value of human life, and human life as a ‘basic good’. 
38 Novak, Sanctity, 153. 
39 Novak, Sanctity, 145. 
40 Novak, Sanctity, 153. 
41 Novak, Sanctity, 153. 
42 Novak, Sanctity, 155. 
43 Novak, Sanctity, 157. 
44 Novak, Sanctity, 153. 
45 Novak, Sanctity, 154. 
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 destroying it’.46 But if one understands ‘care’ more expansively, as including (e.g.) much-
needed relief from pain, then it is not obvious that euthanasia cannot count as a species of 
care. At the very least, it does not count obviously as a species of harm. Given this, it is 
telling that Novak’s central example of societal care is the Hutterite practice of rallying 
around those with bipolar or manic-depressive disorder.47 As Novak comments, this form of 
care ensures the Hutterites have a very low suicide rate. But it is consistent with this to hold 
that, even with the best psychological care in the world, there may be (especially physical) 
conditions which cannot be relieved short of death. 
 
II. The Fourfold Dialectic between Autonomy and Compassion 
 
 I have argued, then, that the political arguments I have outlined against legalising 
euthanasia are deficient as they stand. Hittinger’s argument for a collapse of state authority 
‘from below’, Anscombe’s argument for such a collapse ‘from above’, and Novak’s argument 
from ‘the prime raison d’être’ of society all fail to establish their conclusion. Nonetheless, I 
think they are all arguing in the right direction: any state which legalises euthanasia is 
embarking on a socially disastrous journey, which will critically damage its authority. In 
order to see this, however, we need to delve deeper into the reasons given for such 
legalisation, and their profound inadequacy. Only against this background will the full force 
of the above arguments become clear. 
 
 The reasons for legalising euthanasia centre on two key values: individual autonomy 
and compassion for suffering. Although, as I shall argue, autonomy in this context is a 
delusive value, it is certainly at the forefront of the euthanasia debate – qua individual ‘self-
determination’. This is evident particularly in the jurisprudential debate, and nowhere more so 
than in America. In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, for instance, Chief Judge Barbara 
Rothstein writes that ‘Like the abortion decision, the decision of a terminally ill person to end 
his or her life “involv[es] … [a] choic[e] central to personal dignity and autonomy”’.48 This 
judgement is heavily reliant on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which defines individual 
liberty as ‘the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State’.49 One need not go this far, 
however, or wax so magniloquent, to see the main point: autonomy is being construed in such 
a way as to confer a strong, even overriding liberty-right50 on the individual, granting him or 
her what Novak calls strong ‘self-ownership’.51 And this construal is borne out clearly in the 
work of Ronald Dworkin, work that has had a marked influence on the jurisprudential debate, 
particularly in the United States. For Dworkin, ‘Making someone die in a way that others 
                                                 
46 Anscombe, ‘Murder …’, 269. 
47 Novak, Sanctity, 157. 
48 Quoted in Hittinger, The First Grace, 139. 
49 Quoted in Hittinger, The First Grace, 139. 
50 It is worth noting that earlier American jurisprudence tended to dwell not on liberty-rights, but rather on 
privacy-rights, following Judge Brandeis’ dictum that the ‘right to be left alone’ is ‘the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilised men’ (quoted in Hittinger, The First Grace, 135). But plainly 
neither abortion nor euthanasia is a private procedure, since they require significant public intervention. Hence 
the shift to liberty-rights. For more on this, see Hittinger, The First Grace, 148, 153; Novak, Sanctity, 144; 
Keown, ‘A New Father …’, 303. 
51 Novak, Sanctity, 152. 
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 approve, but he believes a horrifying contradiction of his life, is a devastating, odious form of 
tyranny’.52 
 
 The trouble with Dworkin’s assertion lies in its second clause, viz. ‘he believes a 
horrifying contradiction of his life’. What this shows is that autonomous decisions have 
grounds, i.e. those who make them must provide reasons for what they decide. And it does 
not take much thought to see that not all reasons are on a par. For what if someone believed 
that dying supported by pillows was ‘a horrifying contradiction of his life’? He or she would 
not be taken seriously, let alone judged the victim of ‘a devastating, odious form of tyranny’. 
This points to the fact that reasons for decision are subject to rational scrutiny, and that self-
determined decision is thus not sufficient eo ipso to command rational compliance. As Brenda 
Almond observes, while it may be true that ‘The moral principle cited by those who favour 
voluntary euthanasia is autonomy’ – at least typically, and in liberal societies – this amounts 
only to ‘the right of people who are ill to make informed decisions concerning their own care 
or treatment’.53 It follows that, notwithstanding the emphasis on self-determination and 
individual liberty in the public euthanasia debate, what legislation actually requires is careful 
sifting of what constitutes an informed decision to seek death. And as Oderberg remarks, this 
renders autonomy an ‘ethical “red herring”’: ‘If the request is genuine, that is, a sincere 
attempt at alienating the right to life, why shouldn’t the doctor accede to the request? Why 
does an evaluation of the patient’s reasons matter? The fact that the reasons do matter itself 
indicates that it is not the voluntariness component that is morally relevant, but the reason for 
the infringement’.54 
 
 Two corollaries of this are worth highlighting. First, in practice, individual autonomy is 
not only sidelined by euthanasia regimes, it is effectively eviscerated. For as Finnis maintains, 
‘your right to autonomy does not give you the right to be assisted in suicide [or to be 
euthanised] unless you are ill enough or suffering enough, or depressed severely and 
incurably enough – in each case “enough” in the view of somebody else, other people’.55 As 
Kevin Yuill puts matters, the bureaucratic apparatus and manifold interventions required by 
legalising euthanasia make individual autonomy merely notional; indeed, if doctors refuse to 
provide euthanasia, on what they take to be sufficient grounds, there arises the phenomenon 
of shaming ‘unapproved suicides’.56 And this serves only to underline the delusion of 
autonomy still further. Secondly, the demise of autonomy as a rationale for euthanasia ushers 
in what I shall call the ‘second stage’ of the dialectic between autonomy and compassion. 
Here the state must attempt to formulate a set of determinate conditions for applying 
euthanasia justly. And as Finnis suggests, this almost inevitably involves a recourse to various 
categories of ‘suffering’. Indeed, this was the case from very early on in the Dutch journey to 
legalising euthanasia. As Gerbert van Loenen relates, ‘What the public failed to notice was 
that in 1984 the [Dutch] High Court explicitly rejected self-determination as grounds for 
accepting euthanasia. The central issue for the highest court was the patient’s suffering’.57 
Even in 1969, J. H. van den Berg, the godfather of the Dutch euthanasia movement, was of 
                                                 
52 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia (London: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1993), 217. 
53 Brenda Almond, Exploring Ethics: A Traveller’s Tale (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998), 159; my 
emphasis. 
54 Oderberg, Applied Ethics, 60. 
55 Finnis, ‘Euthanasia and the Law’, 258. 
56 See Kevin Yuill, Assisted Suicide: The Liberal, Humanist Case against Legalization (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 152. 
57 Van Loenen, Do You Call This A Life?, 5. 
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 the opinion that ‘Euthanasia’s appeal was not based on voluntariness … or on self-
determination, but rather on mercy (or compassion)’.58 
 
 With this second stage of the dialectic, the full implications of legalising euthanasia 
begin to unfold. First, since the true rationale for euthanasia is compassion, not autonomy, the 
question arises of why an autonomous decision is even necessary for it to be authorised. As 
Finnis comments, if supposedly objective ‘judgements about … a person’s life are decisive, 
why not also when the judgement about insufficient or negative quality of life is the same but 
the request for help to terminate life cannot be made? Or has not been made?’59 And such in 
fact has been the direction of argument and practice. In the Netherlands, for instance, the 2005 
Groningen Protocol opened the door to killing disabled infants. This has resulted in a 
significant number of deaths, especially of children with spina bifida.60 And van Loenen 
details more widely the willingness of Dutch medical practitioners to implement non-
voluntary euthanasia.61 Hence autonomous decision turns out to be not only insufficient for 
euthanasia, but also unnecessary. Secondly, and crucially, the task of arriving at a determinate 
and practicable construal of ‘unbearable and irremediable suffering’ proves impossible. For if 
euthanasia is restricted to those with terminal illnesses, the question arises of what ‘terminal’ 
means, and why those with other forms of illness are allowed to suffer. But if illness in 
general is admitted, why not mental illness as well as physical illness? For surely mental 
illness can also be a cause of severe suffering. But if mental illness is admitted, why not other 
claims to unbearable and irremediable psychological suffering, since it seems arbitrary and 
callous to restrict euthanasia ‘treatment’ to those with designated mental disorders. In this 
way, what looked like a viable and legislatable category unravels, revealing it as no more 
substantial than ‘autonomy’ before it.62 
 
 Lest this be thought merely a logical claim – though it is also that – the empirical 
evidence demonstrates how compassion for suffering has licensed an almost infinite 
expansion of grounds for euthanasia. Belgium arguably bears most dramatic witness to this. 
In 2015, the daughter of Simona De Moor died during an operation aged 58; her mother, aged 
85 and experiencing ‘unbearable grief’, decided soon after to request euthanasia. In perfect 
physical health, she was legally euthanised that June.63 Godelieva De Troyer, from Hasselt, 
                                                 
58 Van Loenen, Do You Call This A Life?, 100. 
59 Finnis, ‘Euthanasia and the Law’, 259. Cf. Anscombe: ‘most propaganda for euthanasia assumes it should be 
voluntary … [but] this is only a way-station … The drive is in the direction of killing people when their lives are 
judged useless or burdensome to themselves or the world’ (Anscombe, ‘Murder …’, 268-9). Cf. also Keown, 
Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy, 44; Keown, ‘A New Father …’, 300. 
60 See (e.g.) James Wilkinson, ‘Position Paper on the Groningen Protocol: Disability Stereotypes, International 
Human Rights, and Infanticide’ (Brussels: International Federation for Spina Bifida and Hydrocephalus, 2009), 
http://www.ifglobal.org/images/stories/groningen-d.pdf; Bruno Debois and Jacques Zeegers, ‘Euthanasia of 
Newborns and the Groningen Protocol’ (Brussels: European Institute of Bioethics, 2014), http://www.ieb-
eib.org/en/pdf/20150204-groningen-eng.pdf. 
61 See van Loenen, Do You Call This A Life?, 10-15, 71-7. 
62 Cf. ‘the categories [of suffering] have a tendency to expand’ (Yuill, Assisted Suicide, 151); ‘after the [Dutch] 
Supreme Court accepted euthanasia in these classic cases [of “terrible physical pain, often as a result of cancer”], 
the court subsequently categorized “mental suffering” as suffering that could be avoided by terminating life … in 
2011, the debate focused mainly on the question whether the elderly person who is not ill but is tired of life has 
the right to request assistance to end his life … the boundaries have been continually pushed back … The 
discussion about one category of people for whom termination of life is accepted draws attention to an adjacent 
category … to whom the same arguments … can be applied. And so the position of the Netherlands is constantly 
shifting’ (van Loenen, Do You Call This A Life?, 72-3). Cf. also Finnis, ‘Euthanasia and the Law’, 263-4 n. 50, 
268. 
63 See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3234917/Elderly-woman-85-reveals-decided-euthanasia-five-
minutes-daughter-died-documentary-follows-journey-death.html.  
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 Flanders, had a traumatic childhood and a difficult marriage (her husband committed suicide). 
Feeling estranged from her children, and experiencing renewed depression, she requested 
euthanasia. She was legally euthanised on 19th April 2012; her family found out the next 
day.64 In late 2009, another Belgian, Tine Nys, split up from her boyfriend. With a history of 
feeling unwanted and unloved, she requested euthanasia, and was legally euthanised in April 
2010 at the age of 38.65 Although Belgium has an official body that claims to monitor the 
implementation of euthanasia, no doctors to date have been accused of malpractice and 
prosecuted. And this state of affairs is approximated also elsewhere. A 75 year-old British ex-
geriatric nurse, Gill Pharaoh, travelled to Switzerland in 2015 for assisted suicide. Despite 
being in perfect health and surrounded by family, she maintained she could not bear the 
prospect of old age and its burdens.66 And more recently, a 70 year-old Greek man, Vassilis 
Dalianos, has requested euthanasia on grounds of crippling debt. He has appealed to the 
European Court of Human Rights, because Greece as yet does not permit euthanasia.67 
 
 What these and similar cases point to is that the notion of ‘unbearable and irremediable 
suffering’ provides and can provide no genuine constraints upon action. As van Loenen 
documents, the Netherlands has seen a situation in which only terminal patients in 
excruciating pain were considered for euthanasia evolve into one where even natural death 
can be pre-empted as too ‘gruesome’,68 and Dutch Ministers of Public Health advocate 
‘legalizing assisted suicide for people who are tired of life’.69 This heralds the third stage of 
the dialectic between autonomy and compassion, namely a reversion to autonomy – but this 
time in a purer, quasi-absolute form. For after confronting an increasing paucity of grounds 
for euthanasia, the conclusion is drawn that only the sufferer him- or herself properly knows 
when euthanasia is justified. Hence we have the advent of groups like the Dutch Uit Vrije Wil 
(‘By Choice’), which is lobbying for a suicide pill to be freely available to all Dutch citizens 
over 70.70 And we see the tabling of a ‘death on demand’ law in the Belgian Parliament, 
which would mean doctors’ having to approve requests for euthanasia within a week, or to 
pass them on to doctors willing to give approval.71 This absolutisation of autonomy is 
anticipated by Novak, who predicts doctors’ being punished if they fail to comply with 
euthanasia requests.72 And it is elaborated by Robert Spaemann, who argues that ‘If it is 
allowed at all to kill someone at his request, and if the dignity of man consists only in his 
                                                 
64 See http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/the-death-treatment.  
65 See https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/belgians-speak-out-our-sister-shopped-for-a-doctor-to-label-her-
autistic-so.  
66 ‘I have gone just over the hill now’, Pharaoh claimed, ‘[and it] is not going to start getting better … I have 
looked after people who are old, on and off, all my life. I have always said, “I am not getting old. I do not think 
old age is fun”’. See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3182813/Healthy-former-nurse-75-died-Swiss-
suicide-clinic-deciding-didn-t-want-risk-burden-family-NHS.html. 
67 See https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/greek-farmer-requests-euthanasia-citing-debts.  
68 Van Loenen, Do You Call This A Life?, 67. 
69 See van Loenen, Do You Call This A Life?, 74. After guiding the Euthanasia Act through Parliament in 2001, 
the Dutch Minister of Public Health, Els Borst, commented: ‘I have seen a person in this situation up close and 
later I talked to another. Both were 95 years old and both were simply fed up. They were bored out of their 
minds and unfortunately they were not bored to death’ (van Loenen, Do You Call This A Life?, 74). Cf. Wim 
Distelmans, who chairs the Belgian Federal Control and Evaluation Commission for euthanasia: ‘We at the 
commission’, he told the New Yorker’s Rachel Aviv, ‘are confronted more and more with patients who are tired 
of dealing with a sum of small ailments – they are what we call “tired of life”’. According to Aviv, Distelmans – 
who has himself euthanised over a hundred people – considers such ‘pain’ nonetheless to be ‘incurable’. See 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/the-death-treatment.  
70 See http://www.uitvrijewil.nu. 
71 See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3491951/Belgian-lawmakers-vote-world-s-death-demand-law-
mean-no-doctor-stop-patient-wants-die.html.  
72 See Novak, Sanctity, 121. 
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 freedom … then it is an impermissible paternalism to evaluate suicidal wishes of this kind at 
all’.73 
 
 An impermissible paternalism, indeed – as Rachel Aviv puts it, there is increasing 
‘disdain for doctors who assume that they know what their patients need’.74 But of course it 
remains the case that doctors are the ones who administer euthanasia. So the fourth and final 
stage in the dialectic between autonomy and compassion is a recursion to the doctors’ 
perspective. This time, however, given the hollowing out of the actual grounds for euthanasia, 
and the de facto control of medics, what ‘compassion’ really amounts to will be 
systematically occluded. Doctors will be forced, in many cases, to invent grounds for 
euthanasia, both in face of the objective lack of them, and in order to maintain the appearance 
of rational accountability.75 And other, more insidious pressures will inevitably be brought to 
bear – the most salient of these being moral and economic. As Finnis outlines the former: 
‘what conceivable legislative pronouncements, … physician reporting, official reporting, 
[etc.] … could remove or even appreciably diminish the patient’s subjection to the pressure of 
the thought that my being killed is what my relatives expect of me and is in any case the 
decent thing to do …?’76And as Novak outlines the latter: ‘[health providers] would save huge 
amounts of money if the average lifespan of their clients were shorter’.77 Taken together, 
these insidious – but real – pressures corrode the last semblance of autonomy which the state 
affords its citizens. As Spaemann eloquently summarises matters: ‘Making suicide a right has 
grievous consequences, for then the bearer of this right is responsible for all the 
consequences, all the personal and financial burdens, which arise from the fact that he does 
not make use of this right. From this derives with logical necessity an illegitimate pressure on 
those who are old or sick’.78 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
73 Spaemann, ‘Human Dignity and Human Nature’, 34. Van Loenen notes that many, if not most Dutch citizens 
already believe they are entitled to euthanasia (see van Loenen, Do You Call This A Life?, 52, 57, 80, 105-106, 
111). This suggests they believe euthanasia is a ‘choice-right’, rather than one grounded in objective interests. 
Benatar remarks that the ‘choice’ theory of rights makes the argument for euthanasia much easier, and that he 
‘happen[s] to think that the Interest theory is preferable’ (see Benatar, ‘Assisted Suicide …’, 299). But despite 
Benatar’s preference here, according to the dialectic I have outlined, it will not – and moreover cannot – be 
honoured under a euthanasia regime. 
74 See http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/the-death-treatment. 
75 NB the case of Tine Nys above, where the doctor in question seems to have invented a ‘diagnosis’ of autism 
(presuming this would justify euthanasia). See https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/belgians-speak-out-our-
sister-shopped-for-a-doctor-to-label-her-autistic-so. 
76 Finnis, ‘Euthanasia and the Law’, 262. Cf. Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy, 56. 
77 Novak, Sanctity, 159. The chances of such economic motivations remaining taboo have lessened, because 
high-profile figures have not only recognised them, but also given them their endorsement. See, for example, 
Baroness Mary Warnock on dementia sufferers’ ‘duty to die’ (viz. duty to be killed): ‘A Duty to Die?’, 
OMSORG 4/2008, 3-5, https://fagbokforlaget.no/filarkiv/Mary%20Warnock.pdf. For a real world example of 
pressure to reduce ‘end-of-life’ costs (from the British NHS), see http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2468112/Revealed-How-GPs-paid-50-bonus-elderly-death-lists.html.  
78 Spaemann, ‘Human Dignity and Human Nature’, 40. In Finnis’ dramatic but rigorous formulation, in a 
euthanasia regime ‘Killing with intent becomes a routine management option. Oh yes, there are restrictions, 
guidelines, paperwork. Well meant. Not utterly irrelevant. But as nothing compared with our doctors’ change in 
heart, professional formation, and conscience’ (Finnis, ‘Euthanasia and the Law’, 260). This ultimate 
dependence on doctors is brought out well by van Loenen, who shows how the chances of being euthanised as a 
disabled infant vary strongly according to which Dutch hospital he or she is placed in (see van Loenen, Do You 
Call This A Life?, 180, 192).     
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  In sum, I have argued that what begins as a call to defend the autonomy of citizens, and 
to show compassion to them in their suffering, devolves into a legal, moral and cultural tissue 
of contradictions and incoherent hopes. And this is borne out not only philosophically, but 
also by mounting empirical evidence. At the first stage of the euthanasia dialectic, there are 
heroic invocations of the individual right to self-determination, but these are quickly shown to 
disintegrate in face of individuals’ subordination to various bureaucratic structures, and the 
actual priority of suffering. At the second stage, ‘unbearable and irremediable suffering’ itself 
turns out to be a highly unstable and unwieldy notion, which fails to place any real or 
determinate limits on the grounds for euthanasia.79 This ushers in stage three, where it 
becomes apparent that compassion for suffering has opened the door to a form of pure 
autonomism: those requesting euthanasia now feel, and are increasingly entitled to it, 
however exiguous their grounds. Fourthly and lastly, this regime of de jure entitlement 
confronts the de facto control of the medical profession, which increasingly becomes the site 
of unaccountable decision-making, and pressures that further impugn the autonomy of 
citizens. All of which bears out the wisdom of the threefold political argument I detailed 
above. For what appeared there an over-stipulative and incomplete case – reliant on premises 
about the state monopoly on lethal ‘force’, guilt as a necessary condition of such force, and 
‘care’ as excluding killing – has now been shown to be fundamentally well-founded. For a 
state that legalises euthanasia steadily erodes both individual autonomy over life, and doctors’ 
accountability for life – and thereby, ultimately, its own authority, which rests on upholding 
both. 
 
 Those who argue for legalising euthanasia are sometimes alert to these forms of erosion 
(though they never consider the evidence for them in detail). They respond characteristically, 
however, by calling simply and solely for legal ‘safeguards’. As Benatar writes, for example, 
we need ‘to build robust safeguards into the legislation that legalizes [assisted suicide and 
voluntary euthanasia]’.80 And Warnock holds that ‘It should not be impossible to draft a 
[euthanasia] Bill with safeguards and penalties attached to prevent its scope being widened’.81 
But this kind of response is profoundly misguided, and moreover shows a startling lack of 
realism. For it appeals as a bulwark against the erosion of patient autonomy and medical 
integrity to precisely the primary cause of their erosion: namely, the law. In the Netherlands 
and Belgium especially – the two jurisdictions where euthanasia has been legal the longest – 
the law has been gradually liberalised through a series of acts and amendments. I mentioned 
the 2005 Groningen Protocol, which extended euthanasia to non-voluntary cases involving 
disabled infants. But there are several other extensions I could have mentioned, of which the 
2014 Belgian extension to ‘terminally’ ill children, with no age limit imposed, is only one.82 
And now we see the tabling of a Belgian bill which proposes what appears a form of pure 
autonomism: viz. an absolute right to euthanasia (see note 71). So it is naïve and irresponsible 
to cast the law as a redoubt against change. No law, so far as I am aware, guarantees its own 
fixity or irrevocability (even at the constitutional level). 
 
 Even if this is conceded, however, and the journey of the Benelux countries lamented, 
there is likely to be a residual and highly indignant cri de coeur: ‘Maybe you have shown that 
autonomy and compassion are inadequate bases on which to legislate, and maybe they do lead 
                                                 
79 Here I would refer the reader to note 69 in particular, where Distelmans, the Chair of the Belgian euthanasia 
Commission – and himself a leading euthanasia advocate – declares that feeling ‘tired of life’ can amount to a 
form of ‘pain’ that is ‘incurable’. 
80 Benatar, ‘Assisted Suicide …’, 308. 
81 Warnock, ‘A Duty to Die?’, 4. 
82 See, e.g., http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26181615.  
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 to the incoherences you outline. But these are as nothing compared to the cases of genuinely 
unbearable and irremediable suffering that undeniably exist. Are you willing to see these 
continue, merely in order to save an abstract principle like that of double effect? This would 
be unconscionable. So whatever the problems entailed by legalising euthanasia, they are 
worth dealing with, given the great costs of doing nothing’. There are several flaws in this line 
of reasoning, but I will highlight only the most salient one, viz. the suggestion that there are 
only two alternatives: either legalise euthanasia, or callously let severe pain continue. This 
presupposes a false dichotomy. Denying the right to euthanise does not entail that citizens 
have ‘a (negative) duty to live’,83 and hence a duty to endure all manner of pain. No one 
committed to banning euthanasia is committed to (say) the indefinite continuance of the pains 
of late-stage cancer. For there are already highly sophisticated drug treatments that can 
efficiently palliate such pain.84 And furthermore, at any stage, patients can already refuse 
treatment designed to save life85 – despite certain scare stories retailed by the media, which 
suggest that hospitals are bent on preserving life at all costs. 
 
 At this final juncture, there may still be an objection: ‘Granted’, the objector might say, 
‘in most cases pain can be palliated, and yes, patients are not under a blanket obligation to 
accept life-saving treatment. But there will always be a small number of cases where severe 
pain cannot be avoided, and for those cases, euthanasia is warranted. By insisting on a 
complete ban, you are condoning the existence of such cases, and that, again, is 
unconscionable’. But here I would say two things. First, the claim that ‘there will always be a 
small number of cases where severe pain cannot be avoided’ is highly disputable. The expert 
palliative care literature I cited in note 84 denies it, and anyway, there is clear evidence that 
physical pain is trumped as a motivation for euthanasia by fears of loss of autonomy and of 
becoming a ‘burden’.86 (This is something usually papered over by euthanasia advocates.) 
Secondly, even if it were true that some cases of severe pain inevitably slip through the net, 
this would by no means justify the overhauling of a state’s legal and criminal justice system, 
and the subsequent (and likely irrevocable) damage done to its moral culture which I have 
outlined. We have seen that such damage is already being done in cultures at the heart of 
Europe; people of conscience have a responsibility to resist its spreading further.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Benatar, ‘Assisted Suicide …’, 300. 
84 For a book-length treatment, see Roger Woodruff, Palliative Medicine: Evidence-Based Symptomatic and 
Supportive Care for Patients with Advanced Cancer (4th edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). For 
public internet sources, see, e.g., Ilora Finlay, ‘Improving Access to Palliative Care for Everyone’, 
http://www.ehospice.com/uk/ArticleView/tabid/10697/ArticleId/16594/language/en-GB/View.aspx; Richard 
Doerflinger and Carlos Gomez, ‘Killing the Pain Not the Patient: Palliative Care vs Assisted Suicide’, 
http://www.usccb.org/about/pro-life-activities/respect-life-program/killing-the-pain.cfm; Roger Woodruff, 
‘Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Are They Clinically Necessary?’, 
http://hospicecare.com/resources/ethical-issues/essays-and-articles-on-ethics-in-palliative-care/euthanasia-and-
physician-assisted-suicide-are-they-clinically-necessary.  
85 See, e.g., Liz Gwyther, ‘Withholding and withdrawing treatment: practical applications of ethical principles in 
end-of-life care’, South African Journal of Bioethics and Law, 1 (1) (June 2008): 24-6. Several philosophers 
argue that excessive extension of life is just as unwarranted as its premature curtailment. See, e.g., Keown, 
Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy, 39, 43; Spaemann, Essays in Anthropology, 68; Spaemann, ‘Human 
Dignity and Human Nature’, 39, 42.  
86 See, e.g., Wesley Smith, Culture of Death: The Assault on Medical Ethics in America (San Francisco, 
California: Encounter Books, 2000), 115. 
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